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Abstract—We study the problem of protecting side channel
leakage observed through query execution in a private data
federa- tions. Private data federations enable multiple data
owners to combine their data and query the union of their secret
data. Existing work focuses on providing data confidentiality via
secure computation and protecting side channel leakage through
variants of oblivious computation. This work uses existing secure
computation platforms and provides a novel relaxtion of oblivious
computation. While oblivious query processing provides strong
privacy guarantees, the signifi- cant peformance overhead makes
it infeasible for large scale workloads. We propose a novel semi-
oblivious query processing model for private data federations.
We provide users with fine grained privacy and performance
tradeoffs for query execu- tion. Our model, K-anonymous query
processing, is based on the widely deployed privacy model k-
anonymity. K-anonymous query processing ensures that the
access patterns and sta- tistical information revealed through
query execution are indistinguisable from those of k or more
records. The model upholds strong privacy guarantees in the
presence of multi- ple query workloads. Our prototype KloakDB
is a decentral- ized private data federation, showing adjustable
speedups of 15X-1060X over oblivious query processing.
I. INTRODUCTION
People and organizations are collecting data at an unprece-
dented rate and many independent parties collect data on the
same topic or area of research. For example, consider two
hospitals serving a single patient but each keeps their own
records on this individual. Data sharing is crucial for enabling
people to realize comprehensive insights from these fractured
datasets. On the other hand, data owners are often hesitant
to release their data to others owing to privacy concerns or
regulatory requirements. Some release anonymized versions
of their datasets, but this compromises the semantics of the
data in unspecified ways and this makes it difficult to join
anonymized data with the data of others. In contrast, a private
data federation makes it possible for data owners to pool their
private data so that clients query and receive precise insights
without needing anyone to disclose their sensitive records to
others in the federation. We consider this challenge in the
context of a data federation, wherein multiple autonomous
database systems are united to appear as one for querying. A
private data federation performs privacy-preserving data ana-
lytics either using cryptographic protocols [1]–[3] or hardware
enclaves [4], [5] to combine the sensitive data of multiple
parties.
In practice, data owners usually pool their private data with
the assistance of a trusted query coordinator, who collects
the sensitive tuples of multiple parties, computes on them
in plaintext, and sends the results to the client. Hence, the
data owners never view one another’s data and the client
only accesses the output of the query, not any input tuples
or intermediate results. This pattern of relying on a trusted
query coordinator arises in many settings including financial
regulators auditing banks [6], [7], electronic health record
research networks [8], [9], and prescription drug monitoring
programs [10]. However, relying on a trusted query coordina-
tor brings downsides. First, finding a trusted third party can
be challenging, and at times inappropriate given the domain.
Second, this burdens the single trusted party with providing
the computational resources required to compute queries on
the joint data set. This setting does not enable data owners
to contribute their existing resources to query processing.
Data owners desire a decentralized and distributed private
data federation which enables data owners to retain exclusive
ownership over their raw records, while removing the trusted
third party.
Hardware enclaves as well as secure-multiparty computation
alone solve the problem of decentralized confidential query
processing for private data federations. They however do not
protect against side channel leakage, specifically in the form
of network traces, I/O patterns, memory access patterns, and
statistical information leaked from operator trees.
Existing work solves the problem of side channel leakage
with oblivious query processing. Here the parties computing
the query learn nothing more about the inputs of others than
they would if if all of the members of the federation uploaded
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their data to a trusted third party that ran the query and returned
its results to the client. However the substantial overhead
makes it impractical to use on large data sets or complex
queries. For example a oblivious equi-join with fully padded
outputs on two relations of length n will unconditionally
output n2 output tuples. We note that while oblivious join algo-
rithms exists which don’t have O(n2) complexity , in order to
mask the output cardinality and join correlations, the join must
output the worst case cardinality unconditionally. Oblivious
query processing’s all or nothing approach is inflexible, not
offering federation members any trade-offs for privacy and
performance.
There are several features that are desirable to have in a
semi-oblivious query processing mechanism. First, it should
reduce the computational complexity of a privacy-preserving
query in comparison to full-oblivious evaluation. Second,
it should work efficiently in a distributed query processing
setting. Third, it should uphold its privacy guarantees over
a wide range of SQL queries and repeated querying over a
given dataset. We introduce a semi-oblivious query processing
model, k-anonymous query processing, to address these goals.
K-anonymous query processing builds on the principles of
k-anonymous data releases. A data release is k-anonymous if
each of its tuples is indistinguishable from those of at least
k − 1 others. By generalizing this to query processing, we
partition the input data into batches of tuples that we pro-
cess obliviously, thereby reducing the overhead of multi-tuple
operators like joins and aggregates. In addition, tuning the k
parameter for a workload offers users a simple and intuitive
“knob” with which to make trade-offs between privacy and
performance. We also focus on k-anonymity because it is the
de facto standard for data release and sharing in electronic
health records [11], [12], educational research [13], [14], and
more [15], [16]. Many of these settings use this technique
to achieve regulatory compliance. Hence, this model of semi-
oblivious computation mirrors the needs of many real-world
private data federations.
KloakDB is a decentralized relational private data federation
that offers k-anonymous query processing. It evaluates its
operators with secure computation to protect the confidential-
ity of data in flight. We also use this technology to make
a query’s transcript semi-oblivious by evaluating a query’s
data obliviously one equivalence class at a time. This system
is agnostic to its cryptographic back-end and supports query
evaluation in software – with secure multiparty computation
(SMC) – or hardware with a trusted execution environment
such as Intel SGX.
KloakDB implements k-anonymous query processing by
constructing a k-anonymous processing view over the tuples
of its member databases. This builds on the concept of k-
anonymous data releases. This view is k-anonymous with
regard to the attributes that inform the control flow of the
query. This view breaks the data into equivalence classes such
that each one contains k or more records with respect to the
control flow. It provides robust workload protection policies,
preventing unauthorized information leakage, and provides a
knob to trade off between privacy and performance. Although
we focus on data federations, all of this system’s techniques
are readily applicable to a single data-owner setting, e.g., when
an organization outsources their database’s storage and query
evaluation to an untrusted cloud service provider.
The main contributions of KloakDB are:
• Formalizing an integrating k-anonymous query process-
ing into a relational data federation.
• Designing and implementing a prototype decentral-
ized private data federation KloakDB, which uses k-
anonymous query processing as it’s semi-oblivious query
processing model, while utilizing secure-multiparty com-
putation and hardware enclaves interchangeably as trusted
backends.
• Evaluating KloakDB on both synthetic and real world
workloads.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II provides
background, Section III provides an overview and guarantees
of our system, Section IV formalizes k-anonymous query pro-
cessing, Section V details our prototypte, KloakDB. Section
VI presents our experimental evaluation. We continue with a
survey of related work in Section VII and conclude.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Side Channel Leakage
Side channel leakage is the information that is leaked
through a program’s execution behavior. Memory access pat-
terns, network patterns, CPU instruction traces contribute to
the execution behavior of a program. With query processing,
output cardinalities and execution time are are examples of
execution behavior which leak side channel information. In
the honest-but-curious setting, corrupted parties will observe
these side channels in order to infer sensitive information
on the data. While these adversaries are considered passive,
these side channels can lead to powerful attacks on private
data. Xu et al [17] showed that access pattern leakage can
extract complete text documents and outlines of JPEG images.
Through repeated querying and with access to the query
distribution and the output cardinalities, an adversary can
determine secret attributes of individual records in a database
[18]. On a macro level, query processing can reveal secret
distributional information about the input data [19].
Existing Techniques and Mitigations Cryptographic tech-
niques such as SMC, ORAM, and oblivious transfer exist to
prevent access pattern leakage. These techniques add prohitive
overhead to query execution, and given that operators output
length and runtime depend on the input, require full padding
of the output to remain fully oblivious [20]. Arasu et. al.
[19] provide algorithms for oblivious query processing in time
O(n log n). Our goal is to provide methods to reduce the
overhead of these algorithms.
We now provide a brief overview of private data federations,
privacy-preserving query evaluation, and k-anonymity.
B. Private Data Federations
A private data federation enables multiple, autonomous
database systems to pool their sensitive data for analysis while
keeping their input records private. It starts with a common
set of table definitions against which the client queries. The
tables may correspond to data on a single host or they may
be horizontally partitioned among multiple data owners. We
focus on the latter scenario in this work, although the system’s
core architecture is amenable to both. This shared schema,
including its functional dependencies, is known by all parties.
This schema is annotated with a security policy. Each
attribute in a federation’s shared schema has a security policy
that determines the information data owners are permitted to
learn when processing a KloakDB query. A column may be
public, or visible to other data owners. All other columns are
k-anonymous and their contents may only be revealed to other
data owners when their values are indistinguishable from those
of at least k − 1 other individuals.
Before the federation accepts its first query, it does a
two-stage setup. First, the data owners and other federation
stakeholders work together to create a security policy based
on the best practices of their domain and any applicable
regulations and they initialize the common data model with
this. Second, a coordinator works with the data owners to
perform private record linkage [21] over individuals or entities
that have records spanning two or more databases so that each
one resolves to a single identifier.
Each data owner wishes to keep their sensitive tuples
private, but they are willing to reveal the results of queries over
the union of their data with that of other federation members.
The query client receives precise results from their queries –
that are not k-anonymous – by default. The data owners may
optional add a security policy for the output of analysis on
their combined data, such as restricting the columns that are
visible to the client or noising their results using differential
privacy.
C. Privacy-preserving Query Evaluation
Privacy preserving query evaluation aims to provide confi-
dentiality, while also protecting against side channel attacks.
In order to preserve confidentiality, KloakDB utilizes hardware
enclaves and secure multiparty computation as the trusted
backends. Trusted backends enable users to share data with
untrusted parties and run computation secretly. Secure enclaves
are enabled by hardware features, whereas secure multi-party
computation requires no additional hardware and is enabled
by cryptographic primitives. Secure multi-party computation
is slower than hardware enclaves, but offer stronger security
guarantees.
1) Secure Multiparty Computation: SMC enables multiple
parties to compute functions on secret data without revealing
the underlying inputs. Given a shared function f(x, y) = z,
two parties can share encrypted data x, y and get the result
of the function z. KloakDB uses EMP Toolkit [22] as our
SMC backend, for the speed that it offers, as well as ease
of interface. EMP Toolkit implements a semi-honest two
party protocol. Briefly, in the semi-honest we expect users
to faithfully execute the SMC protocol, however they will
attempt to learn any information they can through observing
the transcript of protocol execution. Our current SMC imple-
mentation allows for only two parties, and does not achieve
feature parity with our hardware enclave implementation.
Recent work has demonstrated efficient SMC protocols for
more than two parties [23], we leave it to future work to
extend our implementation to utilize more than two parties.
2) Hardware Enclaves: Trusted execution environments
such as Intel SGX [4] and AMD Memory Encryption [5] are
available on most new commodity systems. They may only
execute trusted code provided by the coordinator. The code
and data associated with an enclave is sealed; the system in
which it is executing may not view or change its contents. This
hardware uses remote attestation to prove to an authority, such
as the coordinator, that the code and data it is running has not
been tampered with and that the code executes on trusted hard-
ware alone. Once an enclave has attested its code, this opens
up a secure communication channel for the data owners to
send their sensitive data to it. Secure enclaves have a protected
region of memory, the encrypted page cache (EPC), that is not
accessible by the host operating system or hypervisor. Recent
research efforts have shown multiple vulnerabilities in hard-
ware enclave implementations. Intel SGX’s memory protection
has received substantial interest from the security community,
with side channel attacks being discovered [4], [24]–[27] and
fixed [28]–[30] on a regular basis. Addressing the shortfalls of
present-day hardware enclave implementations is beyond the
scope of this work.
D. K-anonymity
A dataset is k-anonymous iff each tuple in it is indistin-
guishable from at least k − 1 others. A quasi-identifier is the
minimal set of attributes in a database that can be joined
with external information to re-identify individuals in the
dataset with high probability [31]. We focus on k-anonymity to
protect sensitive data while providing high-performance query
processing despite its security shortcomings when used for
data release [32]–[36]. We do this because of the technique’s
potential for direct impact in many important application
domains. In addition, we observe that we use it to protect
the transcript of a query’s execution, rather than the results
of its queries. We recognize that differential privacy has
surpassed k-anonymity as the golden standard for privacy
release. However, we believe that KloakDB can be useful
for those domains and users which continue to utilize k-
anonymity.
There is an abundance of research on constructing a k-
anonymous release from a private dataset [37]–[41]. They are
optimized for utility and they minimize the difference between
the released data and its private, original values. This preserves
the semantics of the source data to make analysis on it as
accurate as possible. In contrast, with k-anonymous query
processing our goal speed up query runtimes. The engine
produces exact query results by default. Hence, we assign
the records to small, indistinguishable equivalence classes that
minimizes the size of each bin to reduce our overhead while
upholding the system’s privacy guarantees as tuples move up
the query tree.
III. OVERVIEW
We now lay out the preliminaries for KloakDB. First, we
define the system’s trust model and security guarantees. We
then describe the architecture of this private data federation
and walk through the steps with which a query will run in
this setting. We then introduce a running example.
A. Private Data Federation
Privacy Assumptions We assume an honest-but-curious pri-
vate data federation. This is considered to a standard trust
model for the untrusted cloud setting [42]. In the PDF
setting, the data owners are the potential adversaries. We
trust the data owners to run the SQL statements from the
query plan to provide accurate inputs for evaluation within
the secure computation. On the other hand, each data owner
will attempt to learn as much as they can from observing the
query’s execution. data owners will monitor memory, CPU,
and network side channels, as well as timing and intermediate
result sizes with local and distributed operators.
If we are executing in trusted hardware, we need not trust
the data owners in KloakDB to faithfully execute query opera-
tors over the sensitive data of others. The enclaves ensure that
queries over the data of others are completed with integrity and
without unauthorized access to their values. Thus even if the
data owner’s operating system is compromised, or they attempt
to act maliciously they will not succeed in compromising the
security policy of a private data federation. For running with
SMC, we operate in the semi-honest model – trusting the data
owners to faithfully execute these cryptographic protocols.
Likewise, the KloakDB query planner is trusted to only admit
queries that meet the security policy of the private data
federation and to construct query plans that will uphold those
policies. A client’s query is visible to all parties including the
data owners.
The KloakDB private data federation consists of two parties:
1) Client: The client has access to the shared schema that
the federation has agreed upon. The client can issue any
query to the federation. The client recieves an encrypted
query result from the federation, and can observe the
amount of time the query takes, however cannot see
intermediate results.
2) Data Owner: Data owners agree upon a shared set
of table definitions a priori. All query processing and
computation happens within the pooling of data owner’s
resources. Data owners recieve encrypted secret data
from each other. They have access only to their own
unencrypted data. Through SMC or trusted hardware
they are able to compute over encrypted data shared
by other data owners, while combining their secret data.
Data owners will snoop on all side channels.
B. Problem Statement
We consider a private data federation P consisting of n data
owners D = {D1, . . . , Dn} with a shared schema T consisting
of relationsR = {R1, . . . , Rn}. The data owners wish to issue
a query workload Q = {Q1, . . . , Qn}. We assume the data
owners fit the honest-but-curious security model. Data owners
have the following requirements:
1) To pool together their computational resources for query
processing.
2) To maintain confidentiality of their private data. When
unioning their data for querying within the federation,
they will only share encrypted data.
3) To be protected from side channel leakage throughout
the query workload.
C. Security Guarantees
We now introduce the anonymity guarantee KloakDB of-
fers data owners during query execution. These queries have
instruction traces that have the same distribution as they would
if the query were executing over a view of the dataset that is
k-anonymous with respect to attributes that alter its control
flow. Control flow attributes contain values that change the
observable instruction traces of k-anonymous query operators
running with secure computation, e.g., how it branches, loops,
and their result sizes. We formally introduce them in Sec-
tion IV and denote the list of attributes with C. With this in
mind, KloakDB guarantees:
Definition 1: K-anonymous Query Processing Given a
set of queries Q = {qi} that access relations R = {Ri},
defined by the schema T . Q has control flow attributes
C, such that C ⊆ T . When the system evaluates Q on
R, there exists a function VC for creating a k-anonymous
view of R with respect to C. A semi-oblivious algorithm A
for running the query workload, satifies the requirements of
k-anonymous query processing iff its instruction traces are
computationally indistinguishable from those of a simulator
running Q over VC(R) for a probabilistic polynomial time
adversary. Therefore:
Trace(Sim(VC(Q))) c≡ Trace(A(Q))
Definition 2:
Intuitively this definition states that any algorithm over a
query workload which guarantees that the instruction traces of
a single tuple are indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other
tuples satisfies k-anonymous query processeing. We introduce
the notion of a k-anonymous view in Section 4.
D. Query Workflow
We examine the workflow of a KloakDB query in Figure 1.
1. It begins when a client submits a SQL statement, Q, to
the system’s thin client running on his or her machine. The
client may be a data owner in the federation or an external
user, such as a researcher in the hospital example in Section I.
KloakDB parses the statement into a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) of database operators, its query tree.
Fig. 1: KloakDB query workflow. Lock denotes secure compu-
tation and the key labels an encrypted communication channel.
2.Next, the client-side planner analyzes the query tree and
uses the schema’s security policy identify the minimal subtree
of its DAG that requires privacy-preserving computation. The
planner assigns each node to run in plaintext or k-anonymous
mode. It also identifies the query plan’s control flow attributes
with which it will select a k-anonymous processing view with
which to run its secure operators. More details on this step are
in Section IV.
3. The query planner next translates the query into a k-
anonymous query execution plan. For the operators computing
on public attributes, we run them in the clear. Whenever
possible, we run them locally and if we do distributed com-
putation in the clear, we project out any private attributes
first and re-join with the base tables after this. The planner
takes the plaintext subtrees and generates a SQL statement
for each and the data owners run them within using their
DBMS. KloakDB then generates secure computation protocols
for the operators that will run k-anonymously. It works with
templated code for each operator, parameterizing it with the
fields they will access, predicates, and other expressions. If
the query is running in trusted hardware, the planner creates
a query template runs it on pre-compiled secure enclave code.
If we are using SMC then it translates the operator into secure
multi-party computation primitives. At the time of this writing,
KloakDB supports a query using SMC or secure enclaves but
not a hybrid of the two.
4. Now that we have a secure query plan that upholds our
privacy guarantees, the KloakDB client sends it to the data
owners. The query plan is public to all data owners. The
data owners run the secure plan’s input SQL statements in
parallel. They now switch to k-anonymous mode. We describe
the details of k-anonymous query processing in Section V.
5. After the query is securely computed amongst the data
owners, the encrypted results are sent back to the KloakDB
client. The KloakDB client decrypts and assembles the query
results - removing any dummy tuples - and returns the final
output to the client who issued the query.
E. Running Example
Consider the query in Figure 2. It counts the times a woman
is diagnosed with a given ailment. It first filters the demo-
graphic table for women, joins the selected tuples with the
2-anon Processing View
demographic
ID Sex
1 M
2 F
3 M
4 F
10 F
11 F
diagnosis
ID Diag
2 flu
4 flu
4 infection
6 infection
12 migraine
13 migraine
True Relations
Client Query:
SELECT diag, COUNT(*)
FROM demographic de, diagnosis di
WHERE de.id = di.id AND sex=F
GROUP BY diag; 
Want to show:
● We don’t know how many equivalence classes an individual participates 
in (e.g., 4 being in flu and infection)
● Aggs and/or filters create dummies too because the EC either emits all 
or emits none.  Perhaps 12 and 13 were filtered out of demo at an 
earlier step.  If we process each EC obliviously, we repartition on diag.  
By the subset rule all bins remain k-anon.  We process migraine, create 
a dummy tuple and drop it over the entire EC.  EC must produce either 
1) empty set; 2) single tuple; or 3) |of input| tuples with dummy padding.
● K-anon processing != k-anon results
K-anonymous Query Processing
COUNT(diag, *, 𝛔sex=F(demographic) ⋈ID diagnosis)
Filter: demoF = 𝛔sex=F(demographic):
KPV:        (0*, F)(0*, F)(1*, F)(1*, F) 
True vals: (2, F)(4, F)(10, F)(11, F) 
Join: djoin = demoF ⋈ID diagnosis:
   KPV:        (0*,0*,flu)(0*,0*,flu)(0*,0*,flu)(0*,0*,flu) 
          (0*,0*,inf)( 0*,0*,inf)(0*,0*,inf)(0*,0*,inf)
   True vals: (2, 2, flu)(2, 4,flu)(4, 2,flu)(4, 4,flu)
                       (2, 4, inf)(2, 6,inf)(4,4,inf) (4,6,inf)
Aggregate: diag,COUNT(*) FROM djoin:
KPV:        (flu,2)(inf,1)
True vals: (flu,2)(inf,1)
1
      
2 3
demographic
ID Sex
0* M
0* F
0* M
0* F
1* F
1* F
diagnosis
ID Diag
0* flu
0* flu
0* infection
0* infection
1* migraine
1* migraine
Fig. 2: K-anonymous query processing example. True (non-
dummy) tuples are underlined.
diagnosis table, and counts the times each condition appears in
the join result. Sex and diagnosis have a k-anonymous security
policy where k = 2. We demonstrate this in the single database
setting such as that of outsourced operations in the cloud.
The query planner first creates a 2-anonymous process-
ing view. To illustrate this, we use generalization–omitting
the least significant digit of the IDs–instead of KloakDB’s
freeform k-anonymization here. The view must have at least
two individuals (IDs) in each equivalence class. All of the
tuples in an equivalence class are indistinguishable from one
another during query processing. We divide the ID column by
10 in both relations to suppress the least significant digit. Each
relation has three equivalence classes, and for demographic
they are: (0*, F) (0*, M), and (1*, F). Each equivalence class
has a bitmask with a bit or dummy tag for each tuple denoting
if it is a placeholder to mask the role of individual tuples in
the group. When we run the query, the filter first examines
each equivalence class and either 1) outputs it in its entirety if
it contains at least one match–obliviously marking a dummy
tag on each tuple to denote if it met the selection criteria; or
2) produces an empty set. The filter outputs two of the three
demographic equivalence classes.
Next, we join the filtered demographics tuples with the
diagnoses using the same all-or nothing logic to uphold tuple
indistinguishability over an equivalence class. When the join
compares two equivalence classes its output is either size of
their cross-product of its inputs or an empty set. This join
outputs two equivalence classes: (0*, flu) and (0*, infection)
and three true tuple matches. If we ran this obliviously the join
would output the cross-product or 36 tuples, instead of the 8
shown here. Clearly, k-anonymous query processing has an
opportunity to substantially boost the performance of private
data federation queries.
After the join, the aggregate iterates on its results one
equivalence class at a time to count up the diagnoses for each
ailment. For a given group-by bin, an aggregate outputs either:
1) a single tuple if >= k individuals contributed to it; or 2)
a dummy-padded set of tuples equal in length to the source
equivalence class. An observer can learn about no fewer than
k individuals at a time by observing these outcomes because
they either learn that all of the tuples in the class had the same
group-by value or that we processed the equivalence class
obliviously. At first glance, it may appear that the group-by
of (0*, infection) would be processed obliviously. As we will
see in the coming sections, the anonymity of an equivalence
class is transitive as it passes through a k-anonymous operator.
Because the join compares all tuples in an equivalence class to
its potential matches in the joining relation, its output is fully
padded. Hence, the join did not reveal its selectivity over this
equivalence class and the groups with which it was paired.
Then the count operator visits all four tuples in the infection
group and emits a single tuple with the true count.
IV. K-ANONYMOUS QUERY PROCESSING
We now reveal how KloakDB upholds the anonymity
guarantees in Definition 1. We do this using the notation
in Figure ??. Consider a query Q that evaluates over the
tables in the private data federation’s shared table definitions,
R = (R1, . . . Rn). This schema is a lossless, dependency-
preserving join decomposition. Intuitively we require the
schema to be a lossless join decomposition since it allows
us to view the union of the relations as a single ”super-
relation”. We found this idea useful for reasoning about the
properties of k-anonymity within multi-relational schemas. We
note that not all schemas are lossless, dependency-preserving
join decompositions, thus this requirement restricts the setting
for k-anonymous query processing. We query a database
instance, D. To capture the information revealed as tuples flow
up the query tree, we model our query processing in terms of
a schema-level k-anonymous view comprised of natural joins
as R∗ = R1 ./ . . . ./ Rn. Recall that in a conventional k-
anonymous data release each tuple in a database instance D is
indistinguishable from at least k− 1 other tuples with respect
to its quasi-identifiers.
We first determine the control flow attributes that must
be handled with k-anonymity for Q. First, we protect the
quasi-identifiers defined by the federation’s access control
policy by anonymizing the ones that alter the control flow or
intermediate result sizes of our query operators. Second, we
take into account the attributes that modify the control flow
of any operator that follows an anonymized one. For example,
the query in Figure 2 joins on a public attribute – patient ID
– and it does so after a filter on a quasi-identifier. In order to
not reveal the patient IDs that are women, we anonymize with
respect to both sex and patient ID.
Control flow attributes are the union of the schema’s quasi-
identifiers and the attributes that alter the control flow of Q
after computing on a quasi-identifier. Recall that we denote
them as C. VC a k-anonymous view of R∗ with respect to
C. The attributes that alter the control flow of each database
operator type are well-known. For joins, their transcript is
based on the values in their join keys, filters base their control
flow using their predicates, aggregates with their group-by
clauses, sorts on their sort keys, and set operations on all
columns on which they are evaluated.
Definition 3: Multi-relation k-anonymity Consider a k-
anonymous view, VC over relations R that is anonymized wrt
attributes C. We say that this view of a database instance D is
k-anonymous iff for every valid value ti ∈ C, σC=ti(VC(R∗))
produces either ≥ k tuples – that may include duplicates – or
an empty set.
In order for us to maintain a k-anonymous view of D
among the data owners, an execution transcript of Q running
over D may reveal no more information than we could glean
from observing an execution of Q over VC(R∗). Individual
k-anonymous operators in KloakDB do this by obliviously
evaluating over each equivalence class discretely. This upholds
the k-anonymous view among the data owners owing to the
following property.
Subset Property [39]: If R is k-anonymous with respect to
C, then R is k-anonymous with respect to any set of attributes
P such that P ⊆ C.
Proof: Consider the frequency set of R with respect to C.
If we remove any attribute Ci from C, then each of its
equivalence classes will remain the same, or it will coalesce
with another one. Thus each frequency set will be greater than
or equal to its previous size. 
In other words, an operator with a control flow that is a
subset of C will merge equivalence classes from the initial
view and thus still be k-anonymous in its query processing.
In addition, we need to ensure that as we sequentially run
operators in the query tree that composing them will uphold
our security guarantees:
Transitivity Property: Given a relation R that is k-anon-
ymous with respect to C, the execution and output cardinalities
of any transformations predicated on C or P ⊆ C are
themselves k-anonymous.
Proof: In VC(D) each tuple is indistinguishable from at least
k − 1 others. Thus the transcript of transformations on a
k-anonymous relation cannot reveal information that is not
present in the source view. 
Owing to the transitivity property, we reason about the view
with which we input each relation, Ri into Q according to its
subset of the control flow attributes. Since every k-anonymous
operator that computes on Ri will leak information about its
control flow attributes or a subset thereof, it will uphold the
federation’s anonymized view of the data. Hence for all Ri ∈
Q, we create a k-anonymous processing view.
Definition 4: K-anonymous Processing View A relation
Ri has control flow attributes ci = Ri ∩ C. The relation is
anonymized as R′i = Vci(Ri). R
′
i is suitable for k-anonymous
query processing iff for all possible projections, piP (R′),
where P ⊆ ci produce ≥ k tuples. Its output admits duplicate
rows.
When we compute over a k-anonymous processing view,
we run a query Q over a subset of the relations, Q(vc1(R1) ./
. . . ./ vcn(Ri)). Since we are eagerly anonymizing the control
flow attributes, our execution traces will protect at a level
greater than or equal to that of running Q(VC(R∗)).
Before we describe how KloakDB’s operators provide the
invariants above, we extend k-anonymous processing views
to the federated setting. When considering anonymized views
in Definition 1, the data is not combined with tuples from
other hosts. In a private data federation a curious data owner
may analyze a queries instruction traces to infer information
about the secret inputs of their peers by “subtracting out” their
contribution to Q.
We now generalize Definition 4 to private data federations
to support the partial view of each data owner that evaluates
one or more equivalence classes in query Q. This unified view
ensures that each host participating in query processing learns
about no fewer than k tuples at a time when they run operators
over an anonymized view.
Definition 5: Federated K-anonymous Processing View
D = VC(R∗) is horizontally partitioned over n hosts, D =
{D1, . . . ,Dn}. To ensure that no data owner learns about
fewer than k tuples at a time, for all of the data owners,
i = 1 . . . n, for all P ⊆ C, piP (VC(D − D〉)), produces
either ≥ k tuples or an empty set. Its output rows may include
duplicates.
If a k-anonymous processing view satisfies Definition 5,
then it will also uphold the guarantees of k-anonymous query
processing regardless of how much data was contributed by
each host for a given operator. This is because even if the host
does a what-if analysis of removing his or her tuples from the
equivalence class, it will not expose data about fewer than k
tuples.
Discussion In the extended version of this paper we discuss the
operator implementations. Briefly, all operators utilize modern
oblivious techniques for execution while also outputting fully
padded cardinalities. With joins this is the full cross product,
for filters, the input relation marked with secret dummy tags,
and aggregates an unconditional tuple for each distinct group
by attribute in the input relation. The key, and simple idea
of this system is the reduce the unit with which oblivious
computation is performed. K-anonymous query processing
offers a rigorous approach to perform oblivious computation
over smaller equivalence classes and it adheres to a well
understood and widely deployed privacy model. Our approach
does not provide any guarantees for data release, the domain
in which k-anonymity is usually deployed. Without operators
outputting fully padded results the overhead for an oblivious
operator algorithms is O(n log n) with respect to non-secure
algorithms [19]. Note that in the case of k-anonymous query
processing, the input size to each oblivious operator algorithm
is k instead of n, since we are grouping tuples together with
size k. Thus performance of any polynomial state of the art
oblivious algorithm will improve, since we decrease the input
size into the oblivious algorithms. (We note that there will still
be a multiplicative factor of n/k).
V. KLOAKDB
We built a prototype implementation of a data federa-
tion that uses K-anonymous query processing as it’s semi-
oblivious query processing model. To provide confidentiality
for users data, the prototype allows for both SMC and se-
cure hardware backends. Critically, our prototype requires no
trusted third party: KloakDB’s query processing environment
is entirely decentralized.
With an agreed upon workload, data owners can collectively
agree upon a set of control flow attributes Cinit and kinit.
(Cinit, k) is shared among the data owners, and the trusted
comptuation platform is bootstrapped across the federation.
When the When the trusted computation backend is SMC,
this involves bootstrapping the SMC library, when the back-
end is secure hardware, this involves sharing keys, booting
up enclaves, and remote attestation. If Cinit is non-empty,
KloakDB runs view anonymization on the input relations with
(Cinit, kinit). (Cinit, kinit) is saved on all data owners as
(Csystem, ksystem), which is used for workload protection.
This concludes the system setup, now the federation is ready
to receive queries from any data owner in the federation.
A. K-Anonymous View Generation
In this section we discuss k-anonymous anonymized view
generation. A random coordinator is chosen amongst the data
owners to run the view generation process.
Step 1 Statistics First the coordinator requests encrypted
histograms for the relations grouped by the control flow
attributes, over all data owners into their trusted backend. With
hardware enclaves, the histograms are sent directly into the
enclave, with SMC, the histograms are shared secrets between
the two parties. Data owners sort the histograms by most
frequently occurring values. Our security assumptions ensure
that data owners will honestly send their statistics.
Step 2 View Generation
Anonymized View Generation Algorithm
Input: K-anonymous parameter k, Control Flow attributes
{Cf} to anonymize over, set of relations {Ri} ⊂ R, statistics
on relations {Si}.
Output: Mapping M : {Cf} → EquivalenceClassID
With the histograms in hand, the coordinator runs an
algorithm such that the views generated fit the definitions
from Definition 5. Any such algorithm which outputs views
with those constraints will allow for k-anonymous query
processing.
View Anonymization Algorithms: The flexibility of view
generation is a similar feature that exists in k-anonymous
data releases. K-anonymity allows different algorithms to be
used to create k-anonymity in a dataset, each with it’s own
objectives [37]–[41], [43]–[45]. Possible objectives for users
to optimize can be dependent on workload, numbers of nodes
in the federation, and type of secure platform backend being
used. Our prototype implements an algorithm similar to the
greedy variant found in Doka et al. [44], extended to the
multi-relational setting as in Nergiz et al. [45]. The algorithm
seeks to minimize the maximum size of any equivalence class.
Step 3 Mapping/Partitioning Partitioning has two different
implementations depending on the trusted backend. This is the
last stage of anonymization.
SMC: We support two parties, and data is a shared secret
resident on both machines, and no partitioning or redistribution
occurs. The generated map between control flow attributes and
equivalence classes is shared across the two hosts, and each
k = 1
Encrypted
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k = n/2 k = n
Oblivious
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K-anonymous query processing
Fig. 3: The privacy-performance decision space offered by k-
anonymous query processing.
tuple privately shared across the two hosts, then mapped to
the appropriate equivalence class in SMC. This ensures that
the mapping remains unknown to the two hosts. With respect
to partitioning, the SMC model presents the union of the data
as a single host, so operator execution behaves as it would in
the single host setting.
Hardware Enclave: After the algorithm has completed, the
coordinator has a map between hashes of control flow groups
and equivalence class IDs. The coordinator sends the map,
as well as a randomly generated hash function to each data
owner’s hardware enclave, where the data owners use the map
to create local anonymized views of the data. Using the hash
function from the coordinator, each data owner Di hashes
the equivalence class ID to determine which data owner, Dr
should receive the local anonymized view. Then the data
owner Di securely sends the equivalence class to the hardware
enclave of the receiving data owner Dr. Dr then combines
the equivalence classes from all sending hosts to form a local
partition of the anonymized view.
B. Query Workflow
Queries are requested into KloakDB by clients as a pair,
(Q, kQ), with Q a query, and kQ the associated k-anonymous
security parameter. Note, data owners explicitly are the only
clients allow to query the federation. First the query Q is
decomposed to determine it’s control flow attributes CQ.
CQ is compared against Csystem, if CQ ⊆ Csystem, and
kQ ≤ ksystem, the query proceeds with (Csystem, ksystem).
Through the subset property in Section IV, we will still
maintain k-anonymous query processing.
If kQ ≥ ksystem, and CQ ⊂ Csystem, the equivalence
classes present in the anonymized views must be combined
to satisfy the security requirements for the query. We run a
simple greedy algorithm to combine equivalence classes until
they satisify kQ, then let ksystem = kQ. If Csystem and CQ
are disjoint, then the system takes the union, Csystem ∪ CQ,
and runs view augmentation. If CQ 6⊂ Csystem, the system
upgrades the query to full oblivious computation. The key is
for a set of queries that run over a set control flow attributes, a
single k-anonymous view can be used multiple times without
any privacy loss.
C. Privacy-Performance Trade Off
K-anonymous query processing enables federation mem-
bers to achieve a profitable trade off between performance
and privacy. We visualize this decision space in Figure 3.
Consider a medical researcher querying their electronic health
records that are stored using encryption in the cloud. She
wishes to set her k to a higher value when she is querying
highly sensitive data. For example, many states require records
pertaining to the treatment of HIV and other sexually trans-
mitted infections have greater k-values than more common
diagnoses [46]. When accessing these records, she would use
oblivious querying. For more common ailments, she is willing
to forgo stronger privacy guarantees in exchange for faster
query runtimes.
This decision space, a range of k values for anonymization,
arises in many settings. In clinical data research, guidelines
for k-anonymization vary. A k from 5-11 is recommended for
most health contexts [47]–[49], although some data providers
suggest k = 3 [50] and other, more sensitive studies call
for k = 30 [51]. For educational data, the US’s FERPA
has various k-anonymization guidelines for a variety of data
release scenarios in [13], [14]. Energy data is also has a range
of k values for its release from k = 5 [52] to k = 15 [53].
By tapping into the expertise of the data federation, we
will realize substantial performance gains by adjusting k to
the sensitivity workload at hand. In practice, a private data
federation may have heterogeneous security policies on client
queries to address these domain-specific nuances.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Implementation
KloakDB is implemented as an in memory distributed
query execution engine. We implement KloakDB in 4000
SLOC of C++. Our prototype supports uses Intel SGX as
the hardware enclave backend and EMP-Toolkit [22] as the
secure multiparty computation library. With EMP-Toolkit our
implementation can support two data owners, however with
SGX, it can support an arbitrary number of data owners. Our
prototype takes as input a SQL query and runs it through
a standard SQL parser. After parsing the query is automati-
cally decomposed to find the control flow attributes, after it
anonymizes which anonymization occurs. The implementation
uses off the shelf RPC libraries with SSL, and encrypts all data
that occurs outside of the trusted backends.
B. Experimental Setup:
We run experiments on two testbeds. Our hardware Intel
SGX benchmarks are run on 4 Ubuntu 16.04 servers running
Intel Core i7 7700k processors, with 32 GB RAM, and a
1 TB 7200 RPM HDD. The SMC experiments are run on
two machines from the same test bed. Our benchmarks utilize
KloakDB in four modes of query processing: plain, encrypted,
k-anonymous, oblivious. Encrypted query processing mode
does not run the queries obliviously, and does not pad the
intermediate result sizes. Oblivious query processing mode
runs the queries obliviously and fully pads the output sizes.
Plain mode runs using PostgreSQL’s Foreign Data Wrapper
(FDW) [54] to simulate a conventional data federation.
C. Workloads
HealthLNK: We test KloakDB over electronic health
records from the HealthLNK data repository [55]. This clinical
data research contains records from seven healthcare sites.
The data repository contains about six million electronic
health records from a diverse institutions–including research
hospitals, clinics, and a county hospital–from 2006 to 2012.
This dataset has significant skew, for example, a patient A with
a disease X , might have more vital recordings than patient B
with disease Y . Running KloakDB on this datatset enables us
to stress our model in the presence of significant skew. We
map each site in the federation to a machine in our four-node
testbed.
We experiment with queries that are based on real clinical
data research protocols for c. diff infections and heart dis-
ease [56], [57]. We use public patient registries for common
ailments to bound the duration of our experiments. A registry
lists the patient identifiers associated with a condition with
no additional information about the individual. We maintain a
patient registry for heart disease sufferers (hd cohort) and one
for individuals affected by c.diff (cdiff cohort), an infection
that is frequently antibiotic-resistant. Our queries are shown
in Table I.
TPC-H: TPC-H is a standard synthetic workload and dataset
which simulates an OLAP environment [58]. We choose
different scale factors depending on the specific experimental
setup, using varying scale factors depending on the experi-
ment. We run use queries 3,5, and 10.
D. TPC-H
Anonymized View Generation Scalability
We run anonymized view generation on one, two, three,
and four relations in SGX with four data owners. We scale
the data size with TPC-H scale factors .1, 1, and 10. We use
the customers, orders, lineitem, and supplier relations from the
TPC-H schema. Orders is anonymized on the ”(o custkey)”,
lineitem on ”(l suppkey,
l orderkey)”, supplier on ”(s suppkey)”, and customer on
”(c custkey)” The results are presented in Figure 4.
The anonymization time scales roughly linearly with the
data size: with a scale factor of .1 is 5s, with scale factor 1
is 44s , with scale factor 10 is 580s. The anonymization time
is not uniform across relations, depending on data size and
range. Gathering histograms requires running a COUNT (∗)
type query on the relation, where the runtime will depend on
size and range. For example, processing the lineitem relation
takes 60% - 70% of the time of the overall anonymization.
Anonymization has substantial network costs since both the
histograms have to be gathered at the coordinator, and then
the anonymization maps must be distributed to all hosts.
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The greedy algorithm we implement for generating the
k-anonymous processing views takes approximately 25% of
the time of anonymization. In workload mode anonymized
views are retained and cached between queries, and thus the
anonymization time can be amortized over a query workload.
While the anonymization time for scale factor 10 is quite high,
it is proportionally to query runtime on a dataset that large.
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K-anonymous Join Study In this experiment we run a join
on two hosts with TPC-H tables lineitem and orders, at scale
factor .01. We anonymize the input relations with respect to
the join key, orderkey. The experiment includes both SMC
as well as SGX execution. As the k-anonymous parameter
increases, join execution time increases proportional to the
k parameter. For a single join, we achieve nearly linear
performance degradation as a parameter of k. We realize this
very efficient result with the following intuition: given n input
tuples in each relation, and an anonymization parameter of
k, each matched equivalence class produces O(k2) tuples.
The anonymized view generator produces approximately n/k
equivalence classes per relation. Hence, the output size of
a k-anonymous join is O(nk). The join’s execution time is
proportional to the size of its inputs, therefore as k increases,
we see a commensurate linear increase in execution time.
SMC: In SMC, the data and anonymization are secretly
shared across the two hosts. KPQ decreases amount of SMC
comparisons executed for the join predicate, since tuples are
only compared within equivalence classes. As we increase
k, those comparisons increase linearly, leading to the linear
performance curve. With k = 5, the SMC join takes 614ms,
k = 100, 12457ms - a 20X performance penalty.
SGX: The SGX backend, similar to SMC, has performance
linear with k. However, SGX does not face the same steep
performance degradation as SMC. With k = 5, the SGX join
takes 49ms, k = 100, 306ms - a 6.2X performance penalty.
The SGX performance curve is linear with respect to k.
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TPC-H Query Workload We run KloakDB on three TPC-H
workload queries 3,5,10 in SGX with four data owners. We run
with scale factor .01 in order to allow the oblivious baseline
Name Query
aspirin SELECT gender, race, avg(pulse) FROM demographics de, diagnosis di, vitals v, medications m
profile WHERE m.med = ’aspirin’ ∧ di.diag = ’hd’ ∧ dd.pid = di.pid ∧ di.pid = v.pid ∧ m.pid = di.pid;
comorbidity SELECT diag, COUNT(*) cnt FROM diagnoses WHERE pid ∈ cdiff_cohort ∧ diag <> ’cdiff’ ORDER BY cnt DESC LIMIT 10;
dosage study SELECT pid FROM diagnoses d, medications m WHERE d.pid = m.pid AND medication = ’aspirin’ AND
icd9 = ’internal bleeding’ AND dosage = ’325mg’
TABLE I: HealthLNK query workload.
to complete. The experiment is run in encrypted mode, k-
anonymous mode with k = 5, 10, 15, 20, and oblivious mode.
This experiment demonstrates two properties of KloakDB: 1)
Tunable performance with k, 2) performance over oblivious
baseline. In 20-anon mode, the queries achieve the following
performance improvements over the oblivious query process-
ing: Q3,1340X; Q5,442X; Q10,602X. On the other hand, the
performance penalty for 20-anon mode vs encrypted are the
following: Q3,6X; Q5, 2.5X; Q10, 9X. Additionally, as we
increase the k from 5-20, the performance scales roughly
linearly with the security parameter.
E. HealthLNK Query Workload
We run KloakDB on our real-world workload in SGX with
four data owners, omitting the anonymization setup time in
the presentation. For the four relations used in our queries,
the anonymization time for a year of data took a little over
two seconds. Our experiments validate the viability of KQP
on a dataset with significant skew.
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Aspirin Profile Operator Performance We analyze the per
operator overhead of KloakDB with the aspirin profile query
in Figure 7. We measure this query’s runtime in encrypted, k-
anonymous (k = 5), and oblivious mode. We randomly select
25 patients from the HealthLNK dataset from one year of data.
Figure 7 presents the operator runtime in each execution
mode. The sequence of three joins is where KQP assumes a
substantial performance gains over oblivious query processing.
In oblivious mode first join emits n2 tuples, the second
produces n3, and so on. In contrast, the expected cardinality
of the first KQP join output is O(nk) tuples, the second
join O(nk2) and so on. The third join takes approximately
6 ms in encrypted mode, 650 ms in k-anonymous, and
93000 ms for oblivious processing. This is a 103x slowdown
between k-anonymous and encrypted, and a 143x slowdown
between oblivious and k-anonymous execution. The aggregate
in encrypted mode takes approximately 5ms, in k-anonymous
6700ms, oblivious 27900ms. The performance gap between k-
anonymous mode and encrypted mode is due an unoptimized
implementation, however the k-anonymous aggregate is 5x
faster than oblivious execution.
The overall runtime for encrypted execution, k-anonymous,
and oblivious is 320 ms, 6600ms, 123,000 ms respectively. The
slowdown incurred by k-anonymous execution compared to
encrypted execution is 21X, and the speedup of k-anonymous
execution in comparison to oblivious execution is 18X. Due
to the prohibitively expensive overhead of oblivious execution,
we sampled only 25 patients for aspirin profile. As the data
size increases, we expect the gap between oblivious and k-
anonymous execution to widen.
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Full Distributed Workload In this section we run the full
query workload in Table I. We demonstrate that k-anonymous
query processing provides substantial performance improve-
ments over oblivious query processing while providing data
protection in comparison to encrypted execution. We run the
queries in four modes: plain, encrypted , k-anonymous, and
oblivious. For the comorbidity and dosage study queries we
run the queries on a full year of data in all four modes.
However, the aspirin profile queries was unable to complete in
oblivious mode on a full year of data, therefore we sample 25
unique patients per host. Figure 8 has the results of the full
workload. The comorbidity query demonstrates that even with
a simple query, k-anonymous query processing is an attrac-
tive alternative to oblivious query processing. K-anonymous
execution has a 15X speedup compared to oblivious execu-
tion, and 6X slowdown compared to encrypted. The dosage
study query sees a 31X speedup in k-anonymous execution
compared to oblivious execution, and a 1.03X slowdown in k-
anonymous execution compared to encrypted. We detailed the
performance for aspirin profile in this query in Section VI-E.
Dosage Study Scale-up In this section we verify that as
the input tuple size increases, the gap between k-anonymous
execution and oblivious execution widens. We use dosage
study so that oblivious execution may complete. We vary
the number of patients we sample to measure performance
changes for data of increasing size in encrypted, 5-anonymous,
and oblivious mode. Figure 9 shows the runtime of this query.
K-anonymous execution is slightly slower than oblivious
execution with 500 sampled patients owing to the overhead
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of itsk-anonymous processing view setup. As the input size
increases, k-anonymous query processing offers significant
performance benefits over full-oblivious query processing.
With 3,000 patients, the runtime for encrypted, k-anonymous,
and full-oblivious query processing respectively are approxi-
mately 181ms, 187ms, and 198369. This yields 1.03X slow-
down for k-anonymous mode compared to encrypted, and
1060X speedup for it in comparison to oblivious. The stark
slowdown for oblivious mode is due to the substantial memory
pressure imposed by exploding cardinalities, leading the join
output to spill to disk one equivalence class at a time. In k-
anonymous mode, scaling the input size from 500 to 3000
patients yields a 1.1X slowdown. This stands in contrast with
the 171X slowdown we observe in oblivious mode. This
experiment highlights an important feature of this system:
KloakDB enables substantial speedups for query processing
as input data scales.
VII. RELATED WORK
KloakDB builds on principles in secure query processing,
oblivious computation, and secure computation. We survey the
existing research in these areas.
Private data federations and were
K-anonymity has been studied extensively. these people
discuss how to maximize data utility with respect to some
objective function. mutiR paper discusses an k-anonymization
scheme for multiple relations. Most of this work discusses
k-anonymity in the context of data release. T Secure query
processing has. K-anonymous query processing is heavily
influenced by these previous works.
KloakDB builds on principles in query processing, applied
security, and automated access control policies. There is sub-
stantial active research in all of these areas and we survey
them in this section.
Speaking broadly, there are two common methods for
methods for general-purpose computing over the data of
two or more mutually distrustful parties: in software with
secure multi-party computation [59], [60] and in hardware
using hardware enclaves [4], [5]. The former is possible
on any system, but exacts a substantial overhead in making
the computation oblivious and encrypting its contents. The
latter requires specialized hardware, but is more efficient. We
chose hardware enclaves for this work, and the principles of
k-anonymous query processing readily generalize to secure
multi-party computation.
There has been substantial work on oblivious query process-
ing using hardware enclaves [19], [61]–[65]. In this setting
a curious observer of an enclave learns nothing about the
data upon which they compute by observing its instruction
traces. We build on this work by offering semi-oblivious query
processing for querying data of moderate sensitivity.
KloakDB is a private data federation. This challenge was
researched with the use of secure multi-party computation
to combine the private data of multiple parties in [1]–[3],
[66]. We extend this work, but examine how to do it semi-
obliviously–rather than with full guarantees of cryptographic
hardness–in exchange for faster query runtimes. Shrinkwrap
[67] considers a similar semi-oblivious model through reduc-
ing the output cardniality of joins with differential privacy.
Our work differs in two ways: 1) Shrinkwrap still requires
executing the full cross product for joins and only after runs
the Shrinkwrap protocol, 2) Shrinkwrap does not support
multiple queries.
K-anonymous data releases were proposed in [31]. There
has been substantial work on efficiently generating k-anony-
mous views of a given dataset [37]–[40], [68], [69]. KloakDB
extends the techniques in [44] to build k-anonymous process-
ing views. We generalize the requirements of multi-relational
k-anonymous data releases in [45] to KloakDB’s compu-
tational model. Automatically enforcing k-anonymous access
control policies in a dataset was researched in [70].
Most of the prior work on oblivious query processing fo-
cuses on outsourced computation from a single data provider,
either in software with secure multi-party computation [71]
or in hardware with hardware enclaves [19], [64]. Some of
them [1]–[3], [66] offer interoperability for multiple data
owners.
There has been limited work on semi-oblivious compu-
tation. The most common method for this is computational
differential privacy [72]. Protocols of this kind leak noisy in-
formation about the data and they are analogous to computing
on a differentially private version of the dataset.
There is also work about computing queries in the cloud
over data stored with fully homomorphic encryption [73],
[74]. Encrypted databases have reduced expressiveness since
they cannot readily compose operators for nested blocks
of select statements. Because KloakDB protects the query’s
computation instead of the data, it supports nested queries.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a semi-oblivious query processing model,
k-anonymous query processing for private data federations.
With KQP, data owners have a fine tuned knob with which
to trade off privacy and performance. Our formalization of
k-anonymous query processing allows for complex queries,
while protecting against unauthorized privacy leakage in the
multiple query setting. This is an important step towards
more approachs that strike a balance between security and
performance for querying private data. Our model is grounded
in k-anonymity, a relevant and widely deployed privacy model.
We built and tested a prototype KloakDB, utilizing both secure
multiparty computation and hardware enclaves to provide
confidentiality.
Our evalution shows KQP provides fine-grained tunablility
for increasing privacy. Our join study demonstrates a linear
tradeoff between privacy and performance. We demonstrate
on TPC-H workloads speedups of up to 440X-2350X. On a
real-world dataset with a real-world workload we demonstrate
speedups of 15X-1060X. Our results show that if KQP is the
appropriate query processing model for a data federation, there
is significant room for performance and scalability gains.
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